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Abstract
This paper develops a new approach to testing hypotheses about the causes of
discrimination in housing sales.  We follow previous research by using data from fair housing
audits, a matched-pair technique for comparing the treatment of equally qualified black and
white home buyers.  Our contribution is to shift the focus from differences in the treatment of
teammates during an audit to agent decisions concerning an individual housing unit.  Our sample
consists of all units seen by either a black or a white auditor in the 1989 national Housing
Discrimination Study.  We estimate a multinomial logit model to explain a real estate agent’s
joint decisions concerning whether to show each unit to a white auditor and to a black auditor.
We find evidence that real estate agents make and act upon inferences about a customer’s
preferences on the basis of the customer’s initial inquiry and that agents practice redlining,
defined as the withholding of units in integrated neighborhoods. We find little evidence to
support the conclusion that agents discriminate because of their own prejudice, but some
evidence that they discriminate because of the prejudice of their white customers.  More
importantly, we find strong evidence of statistical discrimination; agents withhold houses from
blacks when the probability of a successful transaction is perceived to be low.
Introduction
Many studies use fair housing audits to measure racial and ethnic housing discrimination
in housing markets.  Each audit compares the treatment of an African American or Hispanic
home seeker with the treatment of an equally qualified white home seeker.1  Discrimination is
defined as unfavorable treatment based solely on a person’s membership in a particular group; in
a sample of audits, discrimination is systematic unfavorable treatment of minority auditors.  This
paper adds to the literature using audits from the 1989 national Housing Discrimination Study
(HDS).
The audit methodology makes it possible not only to measure discrimination, but also to
observe the circumstances under which discrimination occurs.  Different theories make different
predictions about discrimination; audit data can be used to determine which predictions best fit
the facts.  This paper employs a unique feature of HDS to test hypotheses about the causes of
discrimination with a new method that has advantages over those in other studies.2 In particular,
we use information on the addresses of all the houses inspected by at least one auditor to shift the
focus of the analysis from an audit to a housing unit.  This shift enables us to determine the
conditions under which a unit is withheld from the black auditor and leads us to striking new
conclusions about the causes of discrimination.  We find, unlike any previous study, strong
evidence of statistical discrimination associated with real estate agents’ preconceptions about
black customers.
Most of the existing literature on discrimination in housing availability focuses on
minority-white differences in the number of housing units recommended or shown to an auditor
(Page 1995; Roychoudhury and Goodman 1992; Yinger 1986, 1995) or on discrete agent choices
2during an audit (Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger 1998, 1999).  In regressions to test hypotheses
about the causes of discrimination, therefore, the dependent variable might be the number of
units recommended or shown and the explanatory variables include average characteristics, such
as neighborhood racial composition, over the set of available units.  These studies can only test
hypotheses that are related to the characteristics of the advertised unit or to average
characteristics of all units seen by either auditor.
Shifting the unit of analysis to an individual housing unit makes it possible to determine
whether a real estate agent’s decision to withhold a house from a minority customer depends on
the characteristics of that particular house, and thereby adds new information for testing
hypotheses about the causes of discrimination.  This information includes whether the unit is the
one that was advertised in the newspaper and was the basis of the audit; the physical
characteristics of the unit, such as the number of bedrooms it contains; and the characteristics of
that unit’s neighborhood, such as its racial or ethnic composition.
The shift to a unit-based analysis also eliminates an endogeneity problem that arises in
previous audit studies because a real estate agent’s decisions simultaneously determine the
number of units shown to a customer (a dependent variable in the old approach) and the
characteristics of those units (explanatory variables); in our approach, an agent’s decision to
show a unit obviously cannot affect the characteristics of that unit.  Moreover, our approach
expands the sample size from the number of audits to the number of units shown to either
auditor, thereby making it easier to separate the effects of different variables on an agent’s
showing decision.
Finally, the shift to a unit-based analysis sheds light on the extent to which real estate
agents’ tendency to show a housing unit to any customer, black or white, depends on the
3characteristics of the unit or its neighborhood.  As a result, we are able to explore hypotheses
about real estate agents’ marketing behavior, such as whether they practice redlining, defined as
a tendency to withhold from all customers the units located in certain types of neighborhoods,
such as those that are integrated.  No previous study has examined this type of behavior.3
This paper is organized as follows.  The first two sections describe the Housing
Discrimination Study and explain our new approach to studying discrimination in general terms.
The third section outlines hypotheses about the causes of discrimination and demonstrates how
to test them with audit data.  The fourth through sixth sections present our econometric
procedure, our data, and our estimation results.  The final section summarizes our key findings.
The Housing Discrimination Study
In the Housing Discrimination Study, each audit was conducted by two teammates, a
white person and a member of a minority group.  To ensure equal qualifications, teammates were
matched according to sex and age, given the same training about how to behave during an audit,
assigned similar socioeconomic characteristics for the purposes of the audit, and sent to the same
real estate agency within a short time of each other.  After visiting an agency to inquire about
available housing, teammates independently recorded what they were told and how they were
treated.
The HDS audits were conducted in 25 metropolitan areas, selected to allow valid
estimates of unfavorable treatment in the United States.  Black-white audits were conducted in
20 areas and Hispanic-white audits were conducted in 13 areas (with both types of audits in 8
areas) during May through August, 1989.  Both sales and rental audits were conducted.  Each
audit was based on audit teammates’ inquiries about the availability of a housing unit mentioned
in an advertisement randomly selected from the major metropolitan newspaper.  Audit
4teammates were assigned incomes and family characteristics that made them qualified for this
advertised unit.  This paper is based on 1,081 black-white sales audits.  Because of the HDS
sampling procedures, our results apply to discrimination that qualified black home seekers can
expect to encounter when they inquire about housing that is advertised in a major metropolitan
newspaper.  For more details on HDS, see Yinger (1995).
New federal anti-discrimination enforcement activities authorized by the 1988 Fair
Housing Amendments Act have been implemented since the HDS data were collected, so these
data may overstate the incidence of discrimination today.  The available evidence does not
support this possibility (see Yinger 1998).  Even if discrimination has declined since 1989,
however, there is no reason to believe that recent developments have altered the factors that lead
housing agents to discriminate, which are the focus on this study.  Moreover, no other data set
comes close to HDS in terms of providing the information needed to test hypotheses about the
causes of discrimination—particularly the information for a unit-based approach.
The Decision to Withhold a Housing Unit
Each HDS auditor recorded the address of every house or condominium that he or she
inspected.  We compared the addresses of housing units shown to the white and black teammates
in a given audit to determine which units were shown to only one teammate and which units
were shown to both.4  Our sample consists of the 2,465 units shown to either teammate.
The real estate agents have access to available housing units both in their files or through
a multiple listing service (MLS), and they must decide which units to show each customer.  An
audit study observes two decisions about each available unit:  whether the agent shows it to the
white customer and whether he shows it to the black customer.  These two decisions result in
four possible outcomes for each available housing unit and each audit team:  the unit is shown to
5both customers, the unit is shown to the white customer only, the unit is shown to the black
customer only, and the unit is not shown to either customer.  In a later section, we develop a
multinomial logit model for analyzing these outcomes as a function of the (actual and assigned)
characteristics of the auditor, the housing agency, the audit, and the housing unit, given that one
outcome (the unit is not shown to either auditor) is never observed.
Hypotheses Tests Concerning Marketing
The shift to a unit-based data set opens the door to testing hypotheses about marketing
behavior by real estate agents that does not involve discrimination.  This type of test is possible
because the unit-based data set involves two observations for each housing unit, one for each
audit teammate, and it is possible to determine whether units are more likely to be shown to both
teammates than to a single teammate, irrespective of race, under some circumstances.
Although this type of behavior does not involve discrimination on the basis of a
customer’s race, it has the potential to shed light on discrimination in two ways.  First, it can
reveal whether real estate agents respond to incentives that are not connected to the race of a
customer.  Any finding that they do so increases the plausibility of a finding that they respond to
similar incentives directly related to a customer’s race.  Second, one kind of marketing behavior,
redlining against houses in integrated areas, has a discriminatory dimension even though it
applies equally to black and white customers.  Our approach makes it possible to observe this
type of behavior, which is illegal under the Fair Housing Act.5
Because little is known about marketing behavior by real estate agents, our strategy is to
identify categories of variables that might influence this behavior, instead of attempting to
develop hypotheses for each variable separately.  We now turn to the five classes of variables we
have identified along with the general hypotheses associated with each class.
6Auditor, Agent, and Audit Characteristics.    This set of variables includes
characteristics of the auditor, such as age and family structure; of the real estate agent, such as
age, ethnicity, and sex; and of the real estate agency, such as its size (see Table 1).  It also
includes specific features of the audit, such as when and where it was conducted and whether the
minority auditor went first or second.  Including these variables makes it possible to test a variety
of hypotheses about agent marketing behavior, such as whether male or female agents market
housing more aggressively.
Characteristics of the Unit Being Shown.     This set of variables describes the housing
unit that defines the observation and its neighborhood (see Table 2).  Including these variables
leads to tests of the general hypothesis that agents are more likely to market some types of units
than others.  For example, an agent might be more eager to market a unit located closer to his
office because less time is required to get there.  In addition, variables describing the racial
composition of the neighborhood make it possible to test for redlining, which exists if agents are
more likely to market units in white than in integrated neighborhoods.  This type of redlining
could occur because agents believe that lenders and home insurance companies practice redlining
against these neighborhoods (see Schill and Wachter 1993) and want to avoid wasting time
showing houses that are unlikely to sell.  This neighborhood-discrimination hypothesis is
supported by Galster, Freiberg, and Houk (1987), Newburger (1995), and Turner (1992), who
find that houses located in minority neighborhoods are less likely than houses in white
neighborhoods to be advertised in the newspaper or marketed through an open house.
Characteristics of the Advertised Unit.     This set of variables describes the housing
unit that is the basis for the audit—the one that the auditors inquire about when they arrive at the
agent’s office.  The variables are defined in Table 2, but the values now refer to the advertised
unit associated with a given housing unit, not the values associated with the housing unit itself.6
7Including these variables in the estimation makes it possible to test the general hypothesis that an
agent’s behavior is influenced by the nature of a customer’s request.  If so, the characteristics of
the advertised unit, such as whether it is located in an integrated neighborhood, may affect the
probability that other available houses are shown.
Characteristics of the Unit Being Shown When it is the Advertised Unit.    These
variables are also defined in Table 2, but their value is zero unless the unit actually is the
advertised unit.  The inclusion of these variables leads to tests of the general hypothesis that the
advertised (i.e., requested) unit is marketed in a different way from other available units (which
may or may not have been advertised).  Statistical significance for variables in this category
indicates that an agent’s marketing behavior is different when it involves a unit that the agent has
advertised and the customer has identified.  Units with these traits might be marketed differently
because (a) an agent only advertises units he is eager (or uneager—the sign could go either way)
to market, (b) an agent’s marketing behavior is different when he is aware that a customer
already knows that a unit is up for sale, or (c) an agent infers that the unit initially requested, that
is, the advertised unit, best meets the customer’s preferences and therefore should be marketed
particularly vigorously, at least to that customer.
Variables to Describe the Match between the Unit Being Shown and the Advertised
Unit.    These variables compare each characteristic (defined in Table 2) of the unit that defines
an observation with the same characteristic for the advertised unit.  Their inclusion in the
estimation makes it possible to test another dimension of the inferred-preferences hypothesis in
the previous paragraph, namely, whether agents make inferences about a customer’s preferences
on the basis of the initial request and are therefore less likely to show units that differ from the
advertised unit.  For example, an agent might be less likely to show a unit with an asking price
far above or far below that of the advertised unit.  To test for this, we include one variable to
8measure the difference between the price of the unit and of the advertised unit if this difference is
positive and another to measure this difference if it is negative.  In the case of qualitative
variables, we simply multiply the variable for the unit being shown by the variable for the
advertised unit.
An agent may also interpret the neighborhood in which the advertised unit is located as
an indication of the auditor’s neighborhood preferences.  The HDS auditors were carefully
instructed not to explicitly reveal any neighborhood preferences.  Nevertheless, real estate agents
may make inferences about neighborhood preferences on the basis of an auditor’s initial request.
Now suppose agents believe they can save themselves time by following these inferences.  If a
customer, black or white, requests a unit in an integrated area, then, according to this argument,
an agent will be more likely to show him other units in integrated neighborhoods.  In other
words, this inferred-preference hypothesis predicts that both blacks and whites will be more
likely to be shown a unit located in the type of neighborhood (white or integrated) that matches
the neighborhood of the advertised unit than a unit located in another type of neighborhood.
Finally, in an effort to conserve their time, agents may tend not to show units that greatly
increase the distance they must drive.  To test this hypothesis, we include the distance between a
unit and the advertised unit.
Established Hypotheses Tests Concerning Discrimination
Existing audit studies test hypotheses about the causes of discrimination by determining
whether differences in treatment between minority and white auditors are associated with
auditor, agent, or audit characteristics, such as those in Table 1.  See Galster (1990b), Ondrich,
Stricker, and Yinger (1998, 1999), or Yinger (1995) for a review.  In this section, we review
hypotheses in the literature and present additional hypothesis tests made possible by a unit-based
data set.
9The agent-prejudice hypothesis, which is based on Becker (1971), states that housing
agents discriminate because of their own personal prejudice.  It can be tested by determining
whether discrimination is influenced by variables correlated with prejudice.  One can ask, for
example, whether discrimination is influenced by the ethnic group of the real estate agent.  Black
agents are presumably less prejudiced against black customers than are white agents, on average,
so a finding that black agents are less likely to discriminate supports this hypothesis.  Another
test of the agent-prejudice hypothesis is based on the assumption that one can make inferences
about an agent’s prejudice by the houses he accepts as listings.  This assumption leads to the
prediction that an agent who advertises a listing in a black or integrated neighborhood, where
some of his customers are more likely to be black or Hispanic, will be less likely to discriminate.
The customer-prejudice hypothesis says that housing agents discriminate to protect
their actual or potential business with prejudiced white customers.7  Agents who work in a
largely white area (as indicated by the location of their office or of the advertised unit) are more
likely to discriminate, therefore, than are agents who work in minority neighborhoods.
Moreover, this hypothesis indicates that discrimination may be particularly high in integrated
neighborhoods where the introduction of a few minority households could result in tipping, and
thereby drive away the agent’s existing contacts.  This hypothesis also suggests that larger real
estate agencies, which have a broader customer base, are less likely to discriminate than smaller
agencies, which may depend on obtaining customers from particular neighborhoods.  A finding
that larger agencies are less likely to discriminate is also consistent with the hypothesis that they
devote more resources to fair-housing education, either because of economies of scale in such
training or because their visibility makes them more likely targets of discrimination suits.
A final hypothesis is that real estate agents practice statistical discrimination.  This type
of discrimination is well known for employment (Arrow 1972; Cain 1986; Phelps 1972) and
10
lending (Ladd 1998; Yinger 1995) but not for the marketing of houses.  In general, statistical
discrimination is said to exist if an economic agent treats people in different groups differently
because the agent believes that (a) it is profitable to base treatment on some unobserved
characteristic and (b) this characteristic differs across groups.8  These beliefs might be accurate,
in which case statistical discrimination is profitable (but still illegal) or it might be based on an
inaccurate stereotype, and therefore lead to unprofitable behavior.9  An application of this
concept to housing can be found in Yinger (1995), who finds evidence to support the view that
landlords are reluctant to rent to single black women because of the stereotype that these women
are often on welfare.
Several authors have proposed an explanation for discrimination, sometimes called the
“perceived preference” hypothesis, that is equivalent to statistical discrimination, but this
equivalence is not widely recognized (see Yinger 1998).  The perceived preference hypothesis
says that real estate agents have preconceptions about the types of neighborhoods that people in
different groups prefer and, to save themselves time and trouble, steer each customer toward the
neighborhoods that fit these preconceptions.  We will pursue this type of hypothesis below, but
with increased precision that comes from our ability to focus on individual housing units.
Hypotheses Tests About Discrimination with a Sample of Units
The structure of our unit-based data set creates new opportunities to test these hypotheses
by interacting the race of the auditor with the housing characteristics defined earlier.
Characteristics of the Unit Being Shown Interacted with Auditor Race.     Including
these variables lead to tests of the general hypothesis that units with certain characteristics or in
certain neighborhoods are more likely than other units to be withheld from black customers.
This general hypothesis could be associated with more than one underlying behavioral
11
hypothesis.  For example, the customer-prejudice hypothesis implies that to prevent tipping
discrimination could be relatively high for units located in an integrated neighborhood.
Statistical discrimination also might be linked to unit or neighborhood characteristics.
Real estate agents might believe, for example, that all households prefer to live with members of
their own race and that a housing transaction is unlikely to be completed when a black customer
is matched to a white neighborhood or a white customer is matched to a black or integrated
neighborhood.  This belief might even dominate the neighborhood preferences that can be
inferred from an auditor’s initial housing request.  This statistical discrimination based on
preconceived preferences predicts that blacks are more likely to encounter discrimination when a
housing unit is in a white area than when it is in a black or integrated area, a different prediction
from that of the customer-prejudice hypothesis.10
Real estate agents may also believe that lenders are unwilling to approve a mortgage (or
insurance companies to provide home insurance) when the race or ethnicity of a customer does
not match that of the neighborhood where the relevant house is located.11  Because a transaction
cannot proceed without a mortgage (and home insurance), agents want to avoid investing time
showing houses where the race or ethnicity of the customer and neighborhood do not match.
This statistical discrimination based on expected lender behavior has exactly the same prediction
about discrimination across neighborhoods as does the previous type.
Another type of statistical discrimination is linked to the price of a unit.  In particular,
real estate agents may assume that black customers are unlikely to be qualified for a relatively
expensive house; despite the fact that audit teammates are equally qualified, therefore, agents’
doubts about black customers qualifications rise with the price of a unit.12  To avoid wasting
their time on unlikely matches, therefore, the tendency of agents to withhold a unit from black
customers increases with unit price.  This statistical discrimination based on preconceived
12
purchasing power predicts, in other words, that discrimination will be higher for more expensive
units.
Characteristics of the Advertised Unit Interacted with Auditor Race.     Including
these variables leads to tests of the general hypothesis that discrimination depends on the nature
of the black customer’s initial request.  For example, the customer-prejudice hypothesis suggests
that agents may want to work with black customers who reveal, through their initial request, a
willingness to move into a neighborhood undergoing racial transition, but may not want to work
with black customers who reveal a preference for a stable integrated area.
Characteristics of the Unit Being Shown When it is the Advertised Unit Interacted
with Auditor Race.   The general hypothesis associated with these variables is that the factors
influencing discrimination are different for advertised units than for other units.  The agent-
prejudice hypothesis suggests, for example, that the advertised unit might be more likely to be
withheld from a black customer than other units because it is a particularly desirable unit that
does not fit agents’ stereotypes of blacks.  In contrast, the customer-prejudice hypothesis
suggests the opposite; units that the agent wants to reserve for white customers are not
advertised.
Variables to Describe the Match between the Unit Itself and the Advertised Unit
Interacted with Race.    Including these variables make it possible to examine the general
hypothesis that inferences about a customer’s preferences based on his or her initial request are,
because of agent’s preconceptions, treated differently depending on whether the customer is
black or white.  A request to see a unit in an expensive neighborhood, for example, might be
accepted as an indication of neighborhood preferences for a white customer but not for a black
customer.  Acting on such a belief, that is, refusing to show houses in expensive neighborhoods
to blacks even when they are requested, is a form of statistical discrimination.
13
Estimation Technique
A sales audit results in two visits to a real estate agency.  Even after controlling for
observable variables, the outcomes for the two visits are not independent because the auditors are
paired on unrecorded characteristics, receive similar training, are sent to the same real estate
agency at about the same time, and are instructed to inquire about the same advertised unit.  For
every relevant unit that is available in that agency, four outcomes are possible:  the unit is
withheld from both auditors, the unit is withheld from the white auditor only, the unit is withheld
from the black auditor only, or the unit is not withheld from either auditor.  A unit can appear in
our sample only if it falls into one of the last three cases, so we face a selection bias in the
sample of observed units.13
To solve this problem, we must condition the sample space on units being shown to at
least one auditor.  Our approach is built on the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
property of the multinomial logit model.  This property states that the ratio of probabilities
(relative odds) of any two outcomes does not depend on the presence or characteristics of a third
outcome in the set of outcomes.  The IIA property of the multinomial logit model follows from
the assumption that the disturbance terms in the stochastic “utility” functions for the outcomes of
each housing unit are statistically independent (see Boersch-Supan, 1987).  This assumption is
implausible without controls for omitted variables that are common to all units within a given
audit.14  Once the IIA property has been used to adjust sample probabilities for the included
outcomes, we treat the unobserved audit-specific effects as random effects and thereby remove
them from the analysis.  These steps lead to a model in which distinct housing units represent
statistically independent observations conditional on observed unit, agency, and auditor
characteristics, as well as unobserved audit-level effects.
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The indicator variable, Y, is one if the unit is withheld from an auditor.  The probability
of this event takes the logit form:
( ) { } { }1 , exp / exp 1 ,i i i i i i i i iP Y Z Z Z ′ ′= θ = θ + β θ + β +   (1)
where ,i W= B indicates whether the auditor is white or black; iZ  is a (column) vector of
observed characteristics of the auditor and her visit, the unit itself, the advertised unit, and the
real estate agent and agency; iβ  is the vector of associated coefficients; and iθ  is the unobserved
random effect for the auditor, representing the combined effect of the unobserved characteristics
of the auditor, the real estate agent, and the real estate agency for each unit in the audit.  Because
it will be necessary to test for differences between Wβ  and Bβ , we define .WB W Bδ = β − β
After conditioning on observable characteristics and the audit effects, WY  and BY  can be
treated as independent, and their joint probabilities can be written as
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ){ }
, , , , , ,
exp (1 ) (1 ) / , , 0,1
W B W B W B W W W B B B
W W W W B B B B W B
P Y Y Z Z P Y Z P Y Z
Y Z Y Z D Y Y
θ θ = θ θ
′ ′
= − θ + β + − θ + β =g g (2)
where
( ) ( ){ } ( ){ } ( ){ }exp exp exp 1.W W W B B B W W W B B BD Z Z Z Z′ ′ ′ ′= θ + β + θ + β + θ + β + θ + β + (3)
Since units for which 1WY =  and 1BY =  are not observed in the sample, it is necessary to adjust
(4) for sample selection.  Letting S be the indicator for sample selection, we have
( ) ( )1 , , , 1 1, 1 , , ,
( 1) / .
W B W B W B W B W BP S Z Z P Y Y Z Z
D D
= θ θ = − = = θ θ
= −
(4)
Conditional on S = 1, joint probabilities for ( ), (1,1)W BY Y ≠  are given by
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Equation (5) is a traditional three-choice multinomial logit model.  Because the random effects
are unobserved, the conditional probabilities in a standard likelihood function cannot be
evaluated for given values of the parameters.  Accordingly, the pair ( , )W Bθ θ  is integrated out of
the likelihood function over their joint distribution using the Heckman-Singer (1984)
nonparametric mixing distribution.15  This logit model leads to estimates for Wβ  and WBδ .
Data
Our HDS unit-based data set is described in Tables 1 and 2, which presents means and
standard deviations for all variables except location and time dummies.  The neighborhood data
in Table 2 is based on the 1990 Census, which was neither available for the HDS reports nor
used for any previous research based on HDS data.16  This table reveals, for example, that the
average asking price was $137,805, that 45.0 percent of the units were advertised units, and that
17.9 percent of the units were in integrated neighborhoods.  We define an integrated
neighborhood as a census tract with a population more than 15 percent black.  This may seem
like a low percentage for such a dividing line, but few houses in the HDS data set are located in
neighborhoods that are heavily integrated or predominantly black (see Turner and Mickelsons
1992).17  Moreover, as shown below, the 15 percent dividing line has explanatory power.
Estimates of the incidence of discrimination are presented in Tables 3 through 5.  These
tables also provide hints about the variables that might influence when discrimination takes
place. Formal, multivariate hypothesis tests are presented below.  Each table contains five
column of sample statistics.  The first column gives the number of observations in the relevant
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subsample.  The second column indicates the probability that a unit is shown to both the white
and the black auditors.  This probability, along with all other probabilities in these tables, is
weighted to account for the HDS sampling plan (see Urban Institute 1991).  The third column
indicates the probability that a unit is shown to the white auditor but not to her black teammate,
which is the probability that the white is favored, and the fourth column shows the probability
that a unit is shown to the black but not the white auditor.  The difference between columns (3)
and (4) is called the net incidence of adverse treatment, which is widely used as a measure of
discrimination.18
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the net incidence of adverse treatment for the entire sample
is 12.6 percent.  The other panels reveal that this net incidence is by no means the same under all
circumstances.  Table 4 examines differences in adverse treatment based on a unit’s
neighborhood characteristics.  This table does not reveal any clear patterns.  Somewhat
surprisingly, for example, net incidence is not much different in white and integrated
neighborhoods.  Table 5 investigates whether adverse treatment depends on the match between
the unit being shown and the advertised unit.  The closeness of the match appears to matter.  For
example, net adverse treatment is high for units that are more expensive (panel A) or in more
expensive neighborhoods (panel B) than the advertised unit.
Estimation Results
We estimate three versions of our multivariate model, one with all the variables defined
earlier, one that leaves out the variables interacting characteristics of the unit being shown and of
the advertised unit, and one that leave out the variables involving characteristics of the advertised
unit when it is the unit being shown.  The appropriate likelihood-ratio tests lead us to reject, at
the 1 percent level, both restricted models in favor of the complete one.19  In other words,
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advertised units are treated differently than other units, and housing agents do appear to make
inferences about a customer’s preferences on the basis of his or her initial request.
Results for the complete model are presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8.  Table 6 contains
multinomial logit coefficient estimates for auditor, agent, and audit characteristics.  Tables 7
and 8 focus on the estimates for housing unit characteristics. Table 7 presents the coefficient
estimates for white auditors ( )Wβ  and Table 8 presents estimates of the difference between the
coefficients for white and black auditors ( )WBδ .  In the first column of Table 6 and in Table 7, a
positive coefficient implies that an increase in the variable decreases the likelihood that the
auditor is shown a unit; in the second column of Table 6 and in Table 8, a positive coefficient
implies that an increase in the variable increases the probability that a black auditor will
encounter discrimination.
Results Concerning Agent Marketing and Redlining
The results in the first column of Tables 6 and 7 explore the determinants of agent
marketing behavior.  Table 6 reveals that, with one notable exception, agents’ marketing
behavior is not significantly tied to auditor, agent, or audit characteristics.  The exception is that
a unit is more likely to be shown if both auditors saw the same agent (row 11, first column).
This result simply reflects differences across agents in the propensity to show any particular unit.
One striking implication of Table 7 is that real estate agents first make inferences about a
customer’s preferences on the basis of his or her initial housing request and then, presumably to
maximize the probability of a match, concentrate on showing units most consistent with those
inferences.  Five sets of findings support this view.  First, advertised units are far more likely to
be shown than other units (row 1, first column).  This finding suggests that agents are
particularly willing to show a unit when a customer has expressed both an interest in it and a
knowledge that it is for sale.  To some degree, this finding, unlike those that follow, may also
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reflect the possibility that agents advertise the units they are most willing to show to many
customers.
Second, agents are less likely to show a unit that has either more or fewer bedrooms than
the advertised unit (row 3, third and fourth columns) or that is in a neighborhood with more or
less old housing than the neighborhood in which the advertised unit is located (row 5, third and
fourth columns).  Agents are also less likely to show units in neighborhoods that have a higher
average value than the advertised unit’s neighborhood (row 4, third column), but this result is
only significant at the 10 percent level.  Apparently, agents do not want to waste their time
showing units that do not match a customer’s (inferred) preferences, so the more an available
unit deviates from a customer’s initial request, the less likely the customer will see it.
Third, a real estate agent’s propensity to show a unit increases with the advertised unit’s
asking price (row 2, second column), unless the unit is the advertised unit (row 2, fifth column,
significant at the 10 percent level).  The first of these results could reflect the fact that an agents’
commission is proportional to the price of the house.  The second result indicates that this
incentive to increase marketing effort as asking price increases is offset by the incentive to
increase marketing effort on units that match the customer’s inferred preferences, which of
course the advertised unit does by definition.
Fourth, agents are less likely to show a house that is new instead of old, particularly if it
is the advertised unit (row 7, first and last columns); however, new houses other than the
advertised unit are no less likely to be shown if the customer asked to see an advertised unit that
is new (row 7, third column, significant at the 10 percent level).20  Again, the results in the first
and last columns say nothing about inferred preferences.  Instead, they suggest that new houses
are often in a development containing similar units and that agents tend to show only some units,
which could be model units or simply the most convenient units, and therefore are less likely to
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show any particular new unit, even the advertised one.  Whatever the interpretation of these
results, however, the result in the third column shows inferred preferences at work; when a
customer inquires about a new unit, other new units, not just model units or convenient units, are
shown at the same rate as are older units.
Fifth, inferred preferences, along with some signs of redlining, show up in the marketing
efforts for units located in central cities and in integrated neighborhoods.  Agents tend not to
show units in integrated neighborhoods (row 10, first column), but this redlining does not occur
when the agent can infer from the auditor’s request that the auditor prefers such a location
(row 10, third column). In the case of advertised units, agents also practice redlining against
white neighborhoods that are close to integrated neighborhoods (row 11, fifth column).  Table 7
also reveals that agents are less likely to show central city units when the advertised unit is in the
central city (row 9, third column), but this effect is weaker for the advertised unit itself (row 9,
fifth column).  Finally, redlining against integrated neighborhoods appears to be less likely in the
central city than in the suburbs (row 14, first column).
To provide more insight into these complex relationships, Tables 9 and 10 sum the
relevant coefficients to show net effects for advertised and non-advertised units in various
neighborhood situations compared to units in white, suburban neighborhoods.21  These tables
also present t-statistics and the number of observations in each cell.  Table 9 shows that
advertised units are about evenly split between central cities and suburbs, but are more likely to
be located in white than in integrated areas.  The coefficients suggest that advertised units are
marketed less strenuously if they are in the central city or in an integrated neighborhood, but
only the effect for suburban integrated neighborhoods is statistically significant (at the 10 percent
level).  Although this result is not highly significant, it is striking to find evidence that agents are
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likely to steer a customer away from a unit in an integrated neighborhood even when she
explicitly asks to see it.
Table 10 provides corresponding results for non-advertised units.  This table is more
complicated than Table 9 because outcomes for non-advertised units depend on outcomes for the
advertised unit.  Three results stand out in this table.  First, the table confirms the role of inferred
preferences concerning integrated neighborhoods.22  In every case, the probability that a unit will
be shown is higher if it is in the same type of neighborhood, white or integrated, as the advertised
unit.  Specifically, the entries in the first row (both units in integrated areas) are always smaller
than the corresponding entries in the second row (only the inspected unit in an integrated area)
and the entries in the fourth row (both units in white areas) are always smaller than the
corresponding entries in the third row (only the inspected unit in a white area).
Second, Table 10 strengthens the conclusion that agents practice redlining against
suburban, integrated neighborhoods.  The strongest result, in the last column of the first row,
indicates that auditors are significantly less likely to be shown units in integrated than in white
neighborhoods even if they inquire about just such a unit.  The coefficients in the last two
columns of the second row are also positive and significant (one at only the 10 percent level);
these results could reflect either inferred preferences or redlining.  Combined with the results of
Galster, Freiberg, and Houk (1987), Newburger (1995) and Turner (1992), these results show
that the impact of redlining is cumulative; not only do agents tend not to advertise units in
integrated neighborhoods, but even when they do advertise such a unit, they tend not to show
other available units in integrated neighborhoods to any customer, black or white.
Third, the results in Table 10 confirm that, contrary to the prediction of inferred
preferences, a non-advertised unit in the central city is less likely to be shown when the
advertised unit is in the central city than when it is in the suburbs.  In fact, the entries in the
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second column are all statistically indistinguishable from zero, whereas three of the entries in the
first column are positive and significant.23  The positive, significant coefficients in the last row of
the first column provide evidence of redlining against central city neighborhoods; even when a
customer inquires about a unit in a white neighborhood in the central city, she is unlikely to be
shown other units in such neighborhoods.  This type of redlining, which is not illegal, could arise
if agents believe central city neighborhoods, unlike suburban ones, are very different from each
other and interpret an auditor’s initial query as a preference for the particular neighborhood in
which the advertised unit is located, not for the central city in general.  In this case, other central
city units are unlikely to be in the same or similar neighborhoods and therefore are relatively
unlikely to be shown.
Given the small sample sizes involved, the results in the second and third columns of
Table 10 should be interpreted with caution.  However, one possible explanation is consistent
with the existence of inferred preferences.  Because almost no central city units are shown to
either auditor when the initial request involves a unit in the suburbs, the central city units that are
shown may have unobserved features that make them similar enough to the customer’s request to
be worth showing;24 in fact, judging from the small, insignificant coefficients in the second
column, these units are just as worth showing as units in white suburbs, the omitted category.
Thus, these coefficient estimates may reflect the impact of the unobserved features, not the
impact of inferred preferences.  Ironically, therefore, agents’ decisions to withhold units in
response to inferred preferences may make it impossible for us to observe other responses to
inferred preferences with our data.  This same phenomenon could explain why the coefficients in
the third column are not significantly different from those in the fourth column.
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Results Concerning Discrimination
Results concerning discrimination can be found in the second columns of Tables 6 and 8.
Only two of the results in Table 6 are statistically significant.  First, black auditors encountered
less discrimination if their assigned audit identity was to be married rather than single (row 2,
second column). This result should not be given much weight, however, because over 90 percent
of the auditors played the role of a spouse (see Table 2) and it is consistent with all three main
hypotheses about discrimination.25  Second, large firms, as identified by the maximum number of
people encountered by either auditor, are less likely to discriminate than are small firms (row 10,
second column).  This result supports the customer-prejudice hypothesis, which says that smaller
firms are particularly concerned about losing business from prejudiced whites in the community
where they operate.  It also is consistent with the possibility that larger firms invest more in fair
housing education.
Table 8 provides extensive evidence that the marketing behavior of real estate agents is
not the same for black and white customers.  First, agents’ marketing efforts increase with asking
price for whites (Table 7, row 2, second column) but not for blacks (Table 8, row 2, second
column).  This difference is smaller, but still exists, for the advertised unit (see row 2, fifth
column, significant at the 10 percent level). We interpret these results as an indication that real
estate agents practice statistical discrimination based on a preconception about the ability of
black customers to purchase expensive homes.  Agents appear to believe that the higher the price
range, the less likely it is that a black customer will be able to complete a transaction; to avoid
wasting time on unlikely transactions, therefore, agents are reluctant to show high-priced units to
blacks.
This preconception could take the form of a belief that black customers, unlike white
customers, are unlikely to be qualified for expensive houses, even if they explicitly ask to see
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them, or a belief that the more expensive the housing, the more likely it is that blacks will
encounter discrimination from lenders.26  Moreover, this preconception might accurately reflect
an agent’s past experience with black customers, or it might draw on general societal stereotypes
and have no predictive power at all.  In either case, acting on the basis of this preconception, as
agents appear to do, constitutes statistical discrimination because it involves using a perceived
average trait for a group to predict an outcome for an individual member of that group.27  This
preconception also appears to be so strong that it is not offset by the information in a customer’s
initial housing request.  Discrimination increases with asking price even for the advertised unit,
although as noted above the effect is smaller than in the case of other units.
Second, for blacks, but not for whites, a unit is more likely to be shown if its value is
below that of the advertised unit (row 2, fourth column).  This result suggests that real estate
agents expect blacks, but not whites, to request more expensive units than they can afford.28
Acting on this preconception, that is, offsetting the inferred preferences of black customers
concerning housing price, is another case of statistical discrimination.
Third, Table 8 reveals that agents increase their marketing efforts for blacks if a unit is in
a neighborhood that has an average house value below (row 4, fourth column) or has less old
housing than (row 5, fourth column) the advertised unit’s neighborhood.  The simplest
explanation for these results is that agents act on the basis of preconceptions about the types of
housing and neighborhood that blacks prefer.  In particular, agents appear willing to offset, for
blacks but not for whites, the neighborhood preferences that can be inferred from the
neighborhood in which the advertised unit is located.  Recall that housing price is held constant
in our regressions.  As a result, agents are acting as if they believe that blacks would be willing
to save money by living in a neighborhood with low average values or by avoiding established
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neighborhoods in exchange for some other housing or neighborhood characteristics of equal
value—despite the contrary information in their initial request.
An alternative explanation for the results in rows 4 and 5 is that real estate agents steer
blacks toward neighborhoods that are less desirable and less established, presumably, following
the customer-prejudice hypothesis, to avoid the nicer, more established neighborhoods where the
agents conduct most of their business.  The results in row 4 indicate that blacks are steered
toward neighborhoods that are less desirable, as measured by average house value.  The results
in row 5 indicate that blacks are steered toward neighborhoods with less old housing, controlling
for average value.  At a given price level, neighborhoods with less old housing are likely to be
less established than others and could even be new developments where real estate agents have
few contacts.  Our data do not allow us to determine which of these two explanations is correct.
Fourth, the results in the row 8 of Table 8 provide more evidence that real estate agents’
preconceptions about blacks influence their inferences about black customer’s preferences.  In
particular, agents are more likely to show a non-advertised unit to blacks if both it and the
advertised unit have some problems (row 8, third and fifth columns).29  Agents do not go out of
their way to show units with problems to blacks, but they are more likely to show these units to
blacks when the initial request indicates a willingness to consider a house with some problems.
This type of request has no impact on the treatment of a white auditor (see Table 7), but it
appears to confirm agents’ stereotypes about black customers and therefore leads agents’ to show
other units with problems to blacks.  Thus, this result provides further evidence of statistical
discrimination, as agents treat blacks and whites differently based on preconceptions about what
customers from different racial groups prefer.
Fifth, Table 8 also indicates that redlining against suburban integrated neighborhoods
does not occur as often when the customer is black (row 10, column 1).  In central cities,
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however, units in integrated neighborhoods, which do not face significant redlining (see
Table 10), are less likely to be shown to blacks than to whites (row 14, first column).30  These
results are consistent with the customer-prejudice hypothesis, which says that discrimination may
be higher in integrated areas threatened with tipping, arguably those central cities, and lower in
more stable integrated areas, arguably those in suburbs.  The central city/suburb distinction may
not accurately identify integrated areas threatened with tipping.  It seems reasonable to suppose,
however, that agents concerned about tipping will not advertise units in neighborhoods where
tipping is likely; after all, it is more difficult to discriminate once a unit has been announced in
the newspaper.  It follows that neighborhoods threatened with tipping, and the associated higher
discrimination, will be observed only for non-advertised units, which is exactly the pattern in
Table 8, although the lower effect for advertised units is not quite significant at the 10 percent
level (row 14, fifth column).
One additional result in Table 8 is intriguing, but only significant at the 10 percent level.
In particular, the farther a unit from the agent’s office, the more likely the agent will show it to
blacks (row 12, first column).  This result provides mild support for the customer-prejudice
hypothesis; selling units far from the agent’s office to blacks is unlikely to have repercussions for
the agent’s reputation with his established white customers.
Conclusions
This paper develops a new way to use fair housing audit data to test hypotheses about the
causes of discrimination.  We examine all the units shown to either the white or the black auditor
using a multinomial logit model.  This model estimates the probability that an auditor sees a unit
as a function of the auditor’s race; characteristics of the unit being shown, including the racial
composition of its neighborhood; and a variety of other variables.
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We find that agents interpret a customer’s initial request as an indication of the
customer’s preferences.  As a result, agents are relatively likely to show the advertised unit and
relatively unlikely to show units that differ from the advertised unit in terms of asking price, size
(number of bedrooms), or neighborhood quality (average house value, share of old housing).
In addition, we find evidence that real estate agents practice redlining in the suburbs,
defined as a low marketing effort in or near integrated neighborhoods.  This behavior, which is
illegal under the Fair Housing Act, arises even for advertised units, that is, even for units that a
customer explicitly asks to see.  This behavior does not take place, however, in central cities.
The focus of the paper is to determine whether discrimination is driven by agent
prejudice, customer prejudice, or statistical discrimination.  We find little evidence to support the
agent-prejudice hypothesis.  Discrimination does not depend on the race of the real estate agent
or on any of the other variables with which this hypothesis can be linked.  We find some
evidence to support the customer-prejudice hypothesis.  Specifically, larger real estate agencies
are less likely to discriminate, and, as in several other studies, discrimination is relatively high in
integrated neighborhoods where tipping appears to be likely.
Our most striking results point to the existence of statistical discrimination.  First, agents’
marketing efforts for blacks, unlike those for whites, do not increase with the asking price of the
advertised unit but they do increase as the asking price of the unit falls below that of the
advertised unit.  These results indicate that agents believe the probability of a successful
transaction with a black customer decreases as the asking price increases, regardless of that
customer’s initial request.  This belief could reflect an agent’s experience with black customers
but it can not, of course, reflect the qualification of the black auditors.  In any case, acting on this
belief is a form of statistical discrimination, because it uses a preconceived characteristic of
blacks on average as a signal about an individual black customer.
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Second, we find extensive evidence that real estate agents make different inferences
about the preferences of black and white customers who make exactly the same housing request.
Discrimination is relatively low for units in neighborhoods with an average house value or with a
share of old housing below that in the advertised unit’s neighborhood, and it is relatively low for
units with visible problems so long as the advertised unit has problems.  These effects are not
linked to particular housing traits, as such, but instead are linked to differences between a unit
and the unit initially requested.  Thus, agents typically accept the initial request as an accurate
portrayal of a white’s preferences but adjust the initial request made by a black to conform with
their preconceptions.  In the case of housing units with visible problems, agents refuse to accept
the initial request as a sign that whites want a house with problems, but have no trouble making
this inference for blacks.  These actions are all further examples of statistical discrimination.
Previous research has not uncovered the prevalence of statistical discrimination largely
because it could not connect discrimination to the characteristics of individual housing units.
Our results indicate that real estate agents’ preconceptions are a central cause of housing
discrimination and that statistical discrimination is widely practiced in housing sales.  We hope
that these topics will be a focus of future research.  Both our method and our results should be of
interest to both scholars and policy makers interested in discriminatory behavior.  We show that
discrimination by real estate agents responds both to their own preconceptions and to rather
subtle economic signals, which makes it both difficult to detect and difficult to extinguish.
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Kwon for excellent research assistance.  The authors are, respectively, Professor of
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Connecticut; and Professor of Economics and Public Administration, Syracuse
University.
1 To keep the exposition concise, this paper refers to non-Hispanic whites as whites.  This
usage is imprecise, however, because many Hispanics are themselves white.  In addition,
this paper defined “race” as a socially defined category associated with a physical
characteristics, such as skin color.  For more on both points, see Yinger (1995).
2. HDS was conducted by researchers from the Urban Institute and Syracuse University.
John Yinger was the HDS research director and Jan Ondrich was the HDS
econometrician.  Steve Ross has worked extensively with the HDS data in partnership
with Ondrich and Yinger.  The HDS data are used by Page (1995); Ondrich, Ross, and
Yinger (forthcoming); Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998, 1999); Turner and
Michelsons (1992); and Yinger (1995).
3. As we will see, however, some related types of marketing behavior have been studied.
4. Some address information is missing, especially unit numbers for condominiums, which
made up 16 percent of the housing units in the sample.  As a result, we developed
procedures to rule out the possibility that teammates saw the same unit when teammates
saw units that had the same, incomplete, address information but differed in some
observable characteristic, such as number of rooms or location in the building.
5. For a clear discussion of the illegality of neighborhood-based discrimination in the case
of lenders, see FFIEC (1996, p. ii).  Redlining by lenders has been extensively studied.
See Schill and Wachter (1993) or Yinger (1995) for a review of the literature.
6. In a few cases, particularly with condominiums, there is more than one advertised unit, in
which case these characteristics refer to the average unit in this set.
7. This hypothesis, like the previous one, can be traced to Becker=s (1971) work on
discrimination in labor markets.  In particular, Becker showed that an employer might
discriminate against black applicants to keep down the wage demands of prejudiced
white employees.
8. As Phelps (1972, p. 659) puts it:  “the employer who seeks to maximize expected profit
will discriminate against blacks or women if he believes them to be less qualified,
reliable, long-term, etc. on the average than whites and men, respectively, and if the cost
of gaining information about the individual applicants is excessive.”  In labor markets,
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the issue is whether employers’ adjustments to observable information about worker
productivity lead to discrimination.  This setting is more complex than the audit setting
because the quality of the observable information may differ across groups.  See Phelps
(1972) and Cain (1986).  In a housing audit, the quality of the information about a
customer’s purchasing power, which is analogous to productivity, is identical across audit
teammates so these complexities do not arise.
9. For further discussion of statistical discrimination and why it is illegal, see Yinger
(1998).
10. Using audit data for Detroit, Roychoudhury and Goodman (1992) find some evidence to
support this prediction.
11. For reviews of the evidence on discrimination in mortgage lending, see Goering and
Wienk (1996) and Ladd (1998).  This literature does not indicate whether discrimination
varies with neighborhood characteristics.
12. The quote from Phelps in endnote 8 makes it clear that statistical discrimination cannot
arise unless the cost of gaining the necessary information is “excessive.”  In an audit, a
housing agent could obtain the information he needs about a customer’s purchasing
power simply by asking, but apparently, inquiries of this type are not usually made.
Moreover, they are more likely to be made for blacks than for whites.  In HDS, for
example, agents didn’t even ask about a customer’s income in over half the audits and the
probability that they made this inquiry was 8 percentage points higher for blacks than for
whites—a difference that was statistically significant.  See Yinger (1995, Table 3.3).
13 We observe the advertised unit even if it is withheld from both auditors.  In this case,
however, many of the unit characteristics relevant to the analysis are missing from the
data.  Thus, we exclude from our sample the few advertised units withheld from both
auditors.
14 We ran a model without controls for omitted variables and obtained substantially
different results for several coefficients.  The complete results are available upon request.
15. Conditional on the WjZ ’s and the BjZ ’s and all sample jS ’s being one, the joint
likelihood contribution of all J units within an audit is given by
( ) ( )
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where K is the number of points of increase, and the likelihood function to be maximized
is the product of joint likelihood contributions across audits in the sample.  To specify K,
we follow Trussell-Richards (1985) by starting with a single point of increase and
successively adding a new point until likelihood improvement stops.  Estimates for
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{ }( , ), 1,...,Wk Bk k Kθ θ =  and 1 1,..., kp p −  are available from the authors upon request,
where ip  is the probability associated with Wiθ  and Biθ  in the mixing distribution.  Note
that Kp  does not provide independent information because the sum of the probabilities is
one.
16. Neighborhood characteristics in the HDS reports and in subsequent research using the
HDS data (see note 3) are based on a private firm’s estimates of demographics in each
census tract in 1988.
17. This outcome presumably reflects the neighborhood discrimination discussed above:
houses in minority neighborhoods are not advertised in the newspaper.
18. For a discussion of net incidence and other measures of discrimination, see Fix, Galster,
and Struyk (1993), Yinger (1995), and, especially, Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger (1999).
19. The complete model with k = 3 has 164 parameters; the other two have 140 and 142
parameters, respectively, and the log-likelihood statistics for the three models are
-2006.49, -2039.50, and -2030.54, respectively.
20. Qualitatively similar but less significant results, which have the same interpretation,
appear for condominiums (row 6).
21. Consider, for example, an advertised unit in an integrated neighborhood in the central
city.  For this type of unit, all the variables in these rows 9, 10, and 14 in Table 7 are
switched “on,” so the net effect (relative to an advertised unit in a white, suburban
neighborhood) involves the sum of all ten coefficients in these three rows.
22. The frequencies also are consistent with the presence of inferred preferences, as agents
who advertise in white areas tend not to show units in integrated areas (see the low
frequencies in the second row) and agents who advertise in integrated areas tend not to
show units in white areas (see the low frequencies in the third row).  However, these
frequencies might also indicate that real estate agents tend to specialize in either white or
integrated areas.
23. Implicit across-cell restrictions in the functional form in Table 8 yield an estimate for the
third row of the second column of Table 10 even with no observations in that cell.  The
coefficients in several other cells with only two observations also are identified primarily
based on across-cell restrictions.
24. Agents who advertise a unit in the suburbs rarely show units in the central city (see the
low frequencies in the second column) and agents who advertise in the central city rarely
show units in the suburbs (see the low frequencies in the third column).  These counts
may indicate that agents choose not to show units conflicting with a customer’s inferred
preferences even if those units are available, or they may indicate that agents with central
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city listings have access to different information sources about available housing than do
agents with suburban listings.
25 . Agent prejudice:  Agents might prefer to deal with married blacks than with single
blacks.  Customer-prejudice:  An agent’s white customers might prefer to have married
black neighbors instead of single black neighbors.  Statistical discrimination:  Agents
may believe that black singles are particularly unlikely to complete a transaction, either
because of assumed financial limitations or anticipated discrimination in mortgage
lending.
26. We attempted to determine which of these two possibilities was at work using 1990
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data, which indicates applications and loan denials by
location by race.  We could not find any HMDA variables with any explanatory power in
our regressions.  This could indicate that real estate agents’ beliefs do not reflect actual
experience with lenders or it could indicate that the HMDA data are not up to the task.
For more on these data, see Goering and Wienk (1996).  It is also possible that agents
believe that white sellers of more expensive homes (or in high-value neighborhoods) tend
not to be willing to sell to blacks (even without contact between the agent and the seller,
as is typical in a MLS transaction).  This seems unlikely, however, because prejudice
tends to decline with income and high-value neighborhoods are not usually threatened
with tipping.
27. The theory of statistical discrimination predicts that preconceptions not connected to
profits will be driven out by competition, at least in the long run, but we have no way to
test for a link to profitability.  Also, this behavior is not statistical discrimination if the
agent acts on the basis of preconceptions that he does not connect to profits.  Real estate
agents, like other people, are certainly not immune to race-based preconceptions that
have nothing to do with profits, but there is no reason to think that these preconceptions
are related to particular housing characteristics, as is the case here.
28. This belief might be based on experience.  Munnell et al. (1995) find, for example, that,
on average, black mortgage applicants have higher loan-to-value and debt-to-income
ratios than do whites.
29. In row 8, the coefficients in both the third and fifth columns are highly significant.  Since
both of these coefficients apply to the advertised unit and the one in the third column is
larger in absolute value, they imply that advertised units with problems are also more
likely to be shown to blacks than to whites, although this effect is small.
30. A table analogous to Table 10 but for the neighborhood variables interacted with race
also reveals that when the advertised unit is in a suburban white neighborhood, agents are
significantly less likely (coefficient = -0.596, t-statistic = -2.15) to withhold units in
suburban integrated neighborhoods from blacks than from whites. In other words, a
request for a unit in a white, suburban neighborhood is more likely to be interpreted as an
indication of a customer’s neighborhood preferences when the customer is white than
32
when she is black.  This result provides more evidence of agent preconceptions—and of
statistical discrimination.
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Table 1.    Variable Descriptions
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Audit Characteristics
Age of the auditora 37.3373 6.9880 24.0 65.73
Audit role = married couplea 0.8812 0.3227 0 1.0
Auditor is femalea 0.6053 0.4889 0 1.0
Audit role = previous ownera 0.4926 0.4974 0 1.0
Agent and Agency Characteristics
Age of agent 42.3921 10.7947 20.0 74.0
Agent is Black 0.0246 0.1541 0 1.0
Agent is female 0.6605 0.4730 0 1.0
Agent used an MLS 0.5156 0.4999 0 1.0
Advertised unit is not inspected 0.1229 0.3284 0 1.0
Maximum number of people encountered 1.8110 1.1688 0 8.0
Audit teammates see the same agent 0.5470 0.5460 0 1.0
Audit Characteristics
Audit is in July 0.4787 0.4996 0 1.0
Audit is in August 0.0548 0.2276 0 1.0
Audit is in the morning 0.3294 0.4701 0 1.0
Black auditor goes first 0.5083 0.5000 0 1.0
     
aAuditor characteristics refer to the black auditor.  White auditor characteristics are the same or similar.
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Table 2.    Housing Unit Characteristics
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Unit is the advertised unit 0.4495 0.4975 0 1.0
Asking price of unit 137804.72 82663.92 11500.00 520000.00
Median housing price in unit’s neighborhood 158734.70 116308.12 22100.00 500001.00
Number of bedroom in the unit 2.8146 0.9821 0 9.0
Unit is a condominium 0.2625 0.4401 0 1.0
Unit is newly constructed 0.0917 0.2886 0 1.0
Unit has visible problemsa 0.1988 0.3992 0 1.0
Advertised unit is in the central city 0.4490 0.4950 0 1.0
Distance to integrated tract 2.9530 2.9160 0.118 21.649
Distance to agent’s office 4.0730 4.4120 0 37.434
Distance to advertised unit 1.5150 3.3650 0 35.900
Share of housing built before 1940 0.4490 0.4950 0 1.0
Unit’s neighborhood > 15 percent black 0.1785 0.3830 0 1.0
     
aVisible problems include peeling paint (interior or exterior), broken windows, and debris in the yard.
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Table 3.    Adverse Treatment by Unit Characteristics
Sample Size
Equal
Treatment
White
Favored
Black
Favored
Net
Incidence
A.  Entire Sample
Entire sample 2,465 0.304 0.411 0.285 0.126
B.  Whether Unit is Advertised Unit
Not advertised unit 1,357 0.091 0.544 0.365 0.179
Advertised unit 1,108 0.564 0.248 0.188 0.060
C.  Asking Price of Unit Compared to Metropolitan Average
Lower asking price 1,332 0.302 0.411 0.287 0.124
Higher asking price 1,133 0.307 0.410 0.283 0.127
D.  Whether Unit is a Condominium
Not a condominium 1,818 0.334 0.401 0.265 0.136
Condominium 647 0.219 0.439 0.342 0.097
E.  Number of Bedrooms in Unit
Fewer than three 779 0.268 0.429 0.303 0.126
Three 1,145 0.331 0.397 0.272 0.125
More than three 541 0.299 0.414 0.287 0.127
F.  Whether the Unit is Newly Constructed
Previously owned 2,239 0.321 0.406 0.273 0.133
Newly constructed 226 0.137 0.456 0.407 0.049
G.  Whether Unit has Visible Problems
No problems 1,975 0.273 0.430 0.297 0.133
Problems 490 0.430 0.333 0.237 0.096
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Table 4.    Adverse Treatment by Neighborhood Characteristics
Sample Size
Equal
Treatment
White
Favored
Black
Favored
Net
Incidence
A.  Average Value in Neighborhood Compared to MSA Aveage
Lower average value 1,458 0.299 0.407 0.284 0.113
Higher average value 1,007 0.311 0.416 0.273 0.143
B.  Racial Composition of Neighborhood
< 5 percent Black 2,025 0.314 0.405 0.281 0.124
> 15 percent Black 440 0.259 0.436 0.305 0.131
C.  Central City Location
In central city 1,098 0.326 0.403 0.271 0.131
In suburbs 1,345 0.283 0.419 0.298 0.120
D. Distance to Integrated Area
High distance 868 0.323 0.386 0.291 0.094
Low distance 1,597 0.294 0.425 0.282 0.143
E.  Distance to Agent’s Office
High distance 819 0.315 0.381 0.304 0.077
Low distance 1,646 0.298 0.426 0.276 0.150
F.  Share of Old Housing
High share 767 0.321 0.419 0.261 0.158
Low share 1,698 0.296 0.408 0.296 0.111
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Table 5.    Adverse Treatment Based on Characteristics of
Unit Compared to Advertised Unit
Sample Size
Equal
Treatment
White
Favored
Black
Favored
Net
Incidence
A.  Asking Price of Unit Compared to Advertised Unit
Unit’s price lower 399 0.095 0.499 0.406 0.093
Similar price 1,560 0.324 0.343 0.233 0.110
Unit’s price higher 506 0.099 0.551 0.350 0.201
B.  Average Value in Unit’s Neighborhood Compared to Advertised Unit
Unit’s value lower 313 0.073 0.492 0.435 0.057
Similar value 1,502 0.347 0.326 0.227 0.099
Unit’s value higher 650 0.084 0.568 0.348 0.220
C.  Number of Bedrooms in Unit Compared to Advertised Unit
Unit has fewer 216 0.102 0.532 0.366 0.167
Unit has same 1,945 0.357 0.387 0.256 0.131
Unit has more 304 0.109 0.477 0.414 0.063
D.  Whether the Unit or Advertised Unit is Newly Constructed
Both previously owned 2,126 0.332 0.399 0.269 0.130
Unit new 156 0.186 0.417 0.397 0.020
Unit previously owned 113 0.097 0.549 0.354 0.195
Both new 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
E.  Whether Unit or Advertised has Visible Problems
Neither with problems 1,839 0.286 0.420 0.294 0.126
Unit with problems 240 0.179 0.496 0.325 0.171
Unit without problems 136 0.088 0.574 0.338 0.236
Both with problems 250 0.696 0.176 0.152 0.024
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Table 6.    Coefficient Estimates for Auditor, Agent,
and Audit Characteristics
Variable Coefficient
Coefficient for
Interaction with Race
Auditor Characteristics
Age of the auditor 1.1627
(1.314)
-0.2887
(-0.325)
Audit role = married couple 0.1053
(0.289)
-0.4966*
(-2.445)
Auditor is female -0.2783
(-1.187)
-1.2789
(-1.004)
Audit role = previous owner 0.0305
(0.145)
-0.0058
(-0.039)
Agent and Agency Characteristics
Age of agent -0.1679
(-0.267)
-0.2127
(-0.344)
Agent is black -0.0500
(-0.129)
-0.0638
(-0.171)
Agent is female -0.0639
(-0.467)
-0.0958
(-0.711)
Agent used an MLS 0.0207
(0.084)
-0.0606
(-0.440)
Advertised unit not inspected 1.2258
(1.692)
-0.3329
(-1.108)
Maximum number of people
encountered
0.0927
(0.879)
-1.2453*
(-2.398)
Audit teammates see the same agent -1.1425*
(-4.826)
-0.0006
(-0.005)
Audit Characteristics
Audit is in July 1.0230
(0.001)
0.0240
(0.000)
Audit is in August 0.7694
(1.416)
0.1141
(0.400)
Audit is in the morning -0.0726
(-0.615)
-0.0229
(-0.144)
Black auditor goes first -0.1540
(-0.735)
0.1799
(0.446)
Note:  t-statistics are in parentheses.  An * indicates significance at the 5 percent level
(two-tailed test).  Estimated with a multinomial logit model.
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Table 7.    Coefficient Estimates for Unit Characteristicsa
Unit Attribute*Adv.
Unit Attribute
Row Variable Name
Unit
Attribute
Advertised Unit
Attribute One Two
Advertised
Unit*Unit
Attribute
1 Advertised Unit -3.7605*
(-2.957)
2 Asking Priceb -7.3351*
(-2.072)
0.3465
(0.426)
-0.3374
(-0.394)
6.5129
(1.858)
3 Number of Bedroomsb 2.6366
(1.001)
1.3542*
(3.279)
1.4165*
(2.641)
-0.1415
(-0.045)
4 Tract Average Valueb 0.0004
(0.002)
1.3376
(1.831)
-0.1517
(-0.409)
-0.0051
(-0.017)
5 Tract Share of Old Housing 0.0750
(0.001)
8.3666*
(2.511)
1.3740*
(3.097)
0.8549*
(2.017)
6 Condominium 0.4695
(0.784)
1.0425
(1.274)
-0.7204
(-0.794)
1.2580
(1.940)
7 New Construction 2.0580*
(2.193)
0.3816
(0.696)
-2.0752
(-1.701)
1.7205*
(2.292)
8 Problems with Unit -0.4265
(-1.125)
-0.5113
(-0.970)
-0.2302
(-0.332)
-0.8852
(-1.488)
9 Unit in Central City -0.8211
(-1.430)
-0.3086
(-0.399)
2.4428*
(2.591)
-1.0511*
(-2.006)
10 Tract Integrated 2.5751*
(3.009)
1.3209
(1.573)
-2.4275*
(-2.139)
-0.5525
(0.650)
11 Distance to Integrated Tract 0.0565
(0.663)
0.1461
(1.251)
-0.0057
(-0.496)
-0.1944*
(-2.332)
12 Distance to Agent’s Office -0.0060
(-0.0098)
0.0791
(0.380)
0.0003
(0.110)
-0.0409
(-0.622)
13 Distance from Unit to
Advertised Unit
0.0083
(0.133)
14 Tract Integrated x Unit in
Central City
-1.8306*
(-2.018)
1.2944
(1.164)
     
aAbsolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  The symbol * represents significance at the 5 percent level or
higher (two-tailed test).  Estimated with a multinomial logit model.
     
bThis variable is continuous.  The unit attribute does not enter the specification directly.  Rather, two variables
are included:  (1) the difference between unit and advertised unit attribute when the difference is positive, and (2)
the absolute value of the difference between unit and advertised unit attribute when the difference is negative.  Their
estimated coefficients are listed in columns labeled one and two, respectively.
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Table 8.    Coefficient Estimates for Unit Characteristics Interacted with Racea
Unit Attribute*Adv.
Unit Attribute
Row Variable Name
Unit
Attribute
Advertised Unit
Attribute One Two
Advertised
Unit*Unit
Attribute
1 Advertised Unit -0.3566
(-0.480)
2 Asking Priceb 5.1591*
(3.069)
-0.1865
(-0.702)
-1.0630*
(-7.440)
-3.7200
(-1.921)
3 Number of Bedroomsb -1.1264
(-0.938)
-0.2332
(-1.618)
0.1211
(0.592)
1.2796
(0.684)
4 Tract Average Valueb -0.1515
(-1.437)
0.1065
(0.657)
-0.4550*
(-2.091)
-0.0090
(-0.061)
5 Tract Share of Old Housing 0.0423
(0.000)
-0.9461
(-1.102)
-2.4158*
(-2.185)
-0.1120
(0.457)
6 Condominium -0.3148
(1.031)
-0.6974
(-1.443)
0.5770
(1.064)
0.6380
(1.679)
7 New Construction -0.2739
(-0.934)
0.2160
(0.858)
-0.2986
(-0.638)
-0.0439
(-0.106)
8 Problems with Unit 0.0974
(0.485)
0.0956
(0.406)
-0.9848*
(-2.675)
0.8127*
(2.206)
9 Unit in Central City 0.0009
(0.003)
0.0276
(0.072)
-0.4342
(-0.954)
0.1694
(0.541)
10 Tract Integrated -0.5957*
(-2.085)
-0.1136
(-0.387)
0.4332
(1.032)
0.0953
(0.204)
11 Distance to Integrated Tract -0.0546
(-1.441)
-0.0769
(-1.586)
0.0053
(1.011)
0.0286
(0.522)
12 Distance to Agent’s Office -0.0440
(-1.699)
-0.0110
(-0.439)
0.0006
(0.377)
0.0005
(0.016)
13 Distance from Unit to
Advertised Unit
0.0330
(1.352)
14 Tract Integrated x Unit in
Central City
0.9263*
(2.532)
-0.9138
(-1.506)
     
aAbsolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  The symbol * represents significance at the 5 percent level or
higher (two-tailed test).
     
bThis variable is continuous.  The unit attribute does not enter the specification directly.  Rather, two variables
are included:  (1) the difference between unit and advertised unit attribute when the difference is positive, and (2)
the absolute value of the difference between unit and advertised unit attribute when the difference is negative.  Their
estimated coefficients are listed in columns labeled one and two, respectively.
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Table 9.    Agent Marketing Behavior by Unit Location,
Advertised Unitsa
Unit in Central CityUnit in Integrated
Neighborhood Yes No
Yes 0.642
(1.199)
[124]
0.916*
(1.648)
[73]
No 0.262
(0.471)
[412]
0.000
(n.a.)
[455]
     
aEach cell contains three entries.  The first number is the
coefficient estimate, the number in parentheses is the t-statistic, and
the number of observations is in brackets.  An asterisk indicates
significance at the 10 percent level or higher (two-tailed test).
Estimated with a multinomial logit model.
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Table 10.    Agent Marketing Behavior by Unit Location,
Non-advertised Unitsa
Unit in Central City
Yes No
Unit in Integrated
Neighborhood
Advertised
Unit in
Central City
Advertised
Unit in
Suburbs
Advertised
Unit in
Central City
Advertised
Unit in
Suburbs
Yes
Advertised unit in
integrated neighborhood
0.951
(1.199)
[62]
-1.118
(-1.347)
[2]
1.160
(1.073)
[2]
1.469*
(1.998)
[54]
Advertised unit in white
neighborhood
2.058*
(2.432)
[21]
-0.077
(-0.090)
[25]
2.266
(1.934)
[2]
2.575*
(3.009)
[55]
No
Advertised unit in
integrated neighborhood
2.634*
(2.751)
[29]
0.500
(0.490)
[0]
1.012
(0.896)
[4]
1.321
(1.573)
[32]
Advertised unit in white
neighborhood
1.313*
(2.826)
[282]
-0.821
(-1.430)
[126]
-0.309
(-0.399)
[9]
0.000
(n.a.)
[607]
     
aEach cell contains three entries.  The first number is the coefficient estimate, the number in
parentheses is the t-statistic, and the number of observations is in brackets.  An asterisk indicates
significance at the 5 percent level or higher (two-tailed test).   Estimated with a multinomial logit
model.
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